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Abstract: Powers of attorney are often interpreted as evidence of trust among the parties involved. 
We build a novel dataset of notarized powers of attorney, capturing a wide variety of agency 
relationships in four large French commercial cities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to 
test hypotheses on the relational basis of economic relationships. We find little support for the idea 
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of a radical shift from personal to anonymous relationships during our period. Our results point to 
more nuanced transformations. The preference for proxies in the same occupation as the principal 
somewhat declined, while professional proxies emerged and principals used relational chains, 
especially involving notaries, to find proxies. 
 
A pervasive yet seldom scrutinized view in economic history and sociology holds great sway in 
descriptions of the transition to the modern period.2 This narrative of modernity contrasts the 
premodern world’s reliance on private-order, personal-based modes of interaction, to which less-
developed societies are confined, with the individualistic framework of impersonal exchanges 
enabled by formal institutions. North and others, for instance, echo Weber’s account of the 
developmental path of societies in which modernization is characterized by ‘the replacement of a 
fraternal by a business relationship, i.e., of a status contract by a purposive contract’.3 This neo-
institutionalist narrative, which views the replacement of personal ties by anonymous market 
exchanges as a condition for economic development, has profoundly influenced the dominant 
accounts of how societies evolve.4 Contemporary actors had already described and debated these 
transformations. Adam Smith praised the move away from noncommercial societies, in which 
personal relationships could imply dependence, to more impersonal commercial societies, which he 
equated with freedom.5 Others, however, feared that trust, and therefore credit, would collapse in 
the context of easily negotiable bills of exchange, corporations with large numbers of shares, and 
professional agents paid to perform the duties of a proxy, instead of friends representing friends. 
                                                          
2
 Hoffman et al., Priceless markets; and Leunig et al., ‘Networks’, are among the few works that have examined 
empirically the significance of personal ties over time for credit and labour markets, respectively. 
3
 North, Understanding; Dixit, ‘On modes’; Polanyi, Great Transformation; Weber, Economy and society, p. 709. 
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revolution and Western growth. 
5




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
They viewed these trends as symptoms of a change from a traditional to a money-driven, possibly 
faithless society.6  
Most historians would certainly dismiss as too crude this storyline of a radical shift from 
personal relationships based on kinship, religion, or ethnicity to more anonymous, self-interested 
ones. However, the divide between ‘early modern’ and ‘modern’ history implicitly validates it. 
Recent studies in early modern history have stressed the ways in which personal relationships could 
mitigate uncertainties or information asymmetries in economic history. They more or less explicitly 
assume that such relationships were not used in later periods.7  
The modernization narrative attributes this allegedly inexorable move of Western societies 
— from personal transactions to anonymous markets — to a build-up of structural changes that, in 
France, arguably culminated at the turn of the nineteenth century. The French Revolution fashioned 
a new legal system by abolishing the privileges of the nobility in 1789 and the guilds in 1791, and, 
with these, the old social order that rested on status. The Napoleonic codification of the 1800s 
promoted more impersonal market relationships by clarifying property rights.8 At the same time, 
profound developments in the organization of commerce accompanied the Industrial Revolution, 
fueling the emergence of competitive and impersonal markets.9 Internally, the opening of canals and 
railways from 1800 to 1850 fostered market expansion. Externally, the growth in transatlantic trade 
in the eighteenth century arguably tested the limits of personal networks and social sanctions. If the 
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standard modernization narrative holds true, it should be easily observable in France over this 
period.  
In reaching new markets, merchants had to overcome, in Braudel’s words, ‘distance, the first 
enemy’.10 Representation furnished a means both to conduct transactions at a distance and to 
support the geographically expanding structure of commerce.  Along with business associations, sea 
loans, insurance, and bills of exchange, powers of attorney were part of the menu of contractual 
choices that offered merchants a device to span space, scale, and scope.  
In this article, we empirically test whether agency relationships became more impersonal in 
France by analyzing power-of-attorney contracts that tied together principals and their proxies. To 
this effect, we use over 2,800 notarized proxy forms, covering four large French commercial cities at 
three different points in time — 1751, 1800, and 1851 — to build a novel dataset containing 
information on the identities of principals and proxies, their relationships, and the terms of these 
delegation contracts. These contracts capture a wide variety of agency relations; e.g., legal 
representation, debt recovery, inheritance proceedings, sale of merchandise, management of 
business and assets.   We combine evidence from both cross-section and time-series dimensions of 
our data to investigate which types of proxy were chosen for each type of task across several 
geographical markets, and when and how these contractual practices responded to the macro 
events of the turn of the century. This allows us to revise the modernization narrative with respect 
to both the characterization and the timing of the supposed drastic shift. 
Our fine-grained description of the general features of powers of attorney unveils a diversity 
of relational bases for cooperation that escapes the personal vs. anonymous dichotomy. Consistent 
with our findings, some scholars have cast doubt on the radical opposition between two ideal-types 
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of economic relationships.11 Accordingly, we have devised more nuanced hypotheses of the 
transformations leading to the birth of modernity, which we test in addition to the main narrative 
described above.12 Inherited relationships were not simply displaced by anonymous exchanges 
based solely on the quality or price of goods.13 Alternative and complementary mechanisms were at 
play: (1) homophily, (2) relational chains, and (3) relations rooted in division of labour and 
professionalization.  
First, relationships based on a shared social status or occupation, or, more generally, the 
preference for persons similar to oneself as partners (‘homophily’), do not have to be restricted to 
inherited ties. Other shared attributes can likewise signal trustworthiness. In our period, Trivellato 
insisted on the shared language of long-distance merchants as such a signal.14 The status of such 
homophily in modernization narratives is unclear. Homophily based on acquired skills or status could 
have replaced inherited ties, allowing markets to grow; or it could in turn have declined, as more 
dissimilar partners in turn opened new opportunities. The relational chain is the second type of 
mechanism that economic sociologists as well as business historians have recognized; for example, 
                                                          
11
 Sociologist Granovetter, ‘Economic action’, for example, questioned what he termed the ‘over-socialized’ 
and ‘under-socialized’ fictions of human behaviour.  
12
 We developed our hypotheses in the context of a wider research project that uses two additional sets of 
sources to examine the narrative of a supposedly decreasing embeddedness of commercial relationships from 
the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Along with powers of attorney, we investigate in a panel data of 
important merchant houses: (1) the first letters in each merchant correspondence (‘lettres d’entrée en 
relation’) so as to understand why some of the first letters attempting to start a relationship were answered 
while others were not; and (2) the use of printed circulars (‘lettres circulaires’), a device that could be 
considered, at first glance, less personal than the classical merchant correspondence. Those two sources only 
inform us about relationships among merchants (large-scale merchants, merchant-bankers), whereas powers 
of attorney allow us to compare merchants with other professional groups. For the first results from these 
other sources, see Bartolomei et al., ‘L’encastrement’. 
13
 Uzzi, ‘Social structure’, calls those ‘arm’s-length’ market relationships. 
14
 Trivellato, Familiarity, shows that mastering the right way to write a business letter, for instance, could 
foster transactions between trans-oceanic partners with different faiths and native languages. Being a 
merchant was something that could be learned (during our period, increasing numbers of merchants’ 
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recommendations have figured prominently in accounts of long-distance trade. A relational chain 
involves at least three actors, and it allows expansion beyond inherited ties.15 In our case, it means 
that principals chose proxies with whom they were not personally acquainted, but whom others had 
recommended. Hoffman et al. investigate the role of notaries in forging ultimately anonymous links 
in French credit markets.16 Repeated relationships between the notary and his client involved the 
exchange of privileged information which the notary drew upon to match unrelated parties. Finally, 
sociological accounts of modernization imply that relationships were progressively dictated by 
division of labour and the emergence of professional agents.17 Following Chandler, business 
historians often endorse this narrative.18 All in all, these more nuanced accounts point not to 
disembeddedness but to an evolution and a reconfiguration of social ties. In addition to testing for 
the ‘stronger version’ of the modernity postulate, we test, in the following sections, for the 
prevalence and evolution of each of these transformations. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section I, we present our data and 
sampling strategy. In Section II, we address the modernization narrative in its boldest form by testing 
for a drastic shift over time in personal relationships between principals and proxies. In the same 
section, we explore our uniquely rich dataset to reveal general patterns on the uses of powers of 
attorney. We then turn to alternative mechanisms supporting relationships based on homophily 
(Section III), relational chains (Section IV), and the professionalization of agents (Section V). We 
discuss our results and avenues for future research in Section VI. 
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 Grossetti et al., ‘Studying relational chains’.  
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I 
The extensive paper trail that powers of attorney (mandats) have left in early modern and 
modern archives testifies to their importance.19 Those proxy forms (procurations) are everywhere in 
the French notarial records and present in most Continental European and U.S. archives.20 For the 
year of 1851, proxy forms represent 14 per cent of all Parisian notarial records (c.60,060 acts in 
total).21  
Despite their centrality for the expansion of trade, their ubiquity in managing many aspects 
of everyday economic life, and the fact that these contracts therefore had an important economic 
impact, ‘scholars usually skip them *powers of attorney+ as mere preliminaries or accessories to the 
more complex and specific contracts’.22 It is, in fact, surprising that discussions in the economics 
literature of principal-agent relationships have not fostered more interest in such contracts, as 
powers of attorney were the main, if not the only, legal vehicle for such relationships in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Even more puzzling is the absence of the mention of powers of 
                                                          
19
 We use ‘proxy form’ to refer to the piece of paper recording the contract, and ‘power of attorney’ to refer to 
the contract itself, which may or may not have been recorded in writing. 
20
 Antunes and Riberio da Silva, ‘Cross-cultural entrepreneurship’ (Amsterdam). Trivellato, Familiarity (several 
European countries). For the U.S.A.: Acker, Deeds; Smith and Owsley, eds., Papers; Price, ‘Manuscript sources’. 
21
 For Paris in 1751, the share was 11% (on c.59,730 acts). For Marseilles in 1751, our estimate is around 17% 
(on c.11,280 acts). In Livorno in 1751 and 1761, Francesca Trivellato (personal communication, 4 July 2017) 
found 18% and 20% of proxy forms, respectively.  
22
 Lopez, ‘Proxy in medieval trade’, p. 189. We found only a few exceptions to this scholarly neglect. In a 
pioneering paper that attracted no followers, the French specialist of notarial records, Jean-Pierre Poisson, 
advocated for a systematic study of powers of attorney as the only way to quantify trust. Recently, a series of 
papers on both sides of the Atlantic treated them as evidence of trust put in wives by husbands traveling 
abroad. Poisson, ‘Sociologie des actes de procuration’; Sturtz, ‘Virginia women’; Dufournaud & Michon, ‘Les 
femmes et le commerce’; Cyr, ‘L’activité économique des femmes’; Grenier and Ferland, ‘Procurations et 
pouvoir féminin’; Palmer, ‘Women and contracts’. Lozano Salado, ‘Dos siglos’, traces the evolution of 
commercial activity in Cadix through powers of attorney.  Mostly ignoring one another, these papers generally 
deal with a very small sample of powers of attorney. The only systematic study, comparable in scope and 
sample size to ours but restricted to a rural region and purely descriptive, is that by Molina Jiménez in ‘Informe 
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attorney in debates about trust in the economic literature.23 In contrast, legal scholarship in fiduciary 
law, a branch of law that deals with agency costs plaguing contracts such as powers of attorney, 
often portrays powers of attorney as the archetype of interpersonal trust but has shown no interest 
in their historical uses.  
Our article fills this gap in the literature by providing the first systematic descriptive account 
of the uses of powers of attorney, unveiling which types of proxy were chosen for each type of task 
over time and in several geographical markets. We deem it likely that many of the patterns that we 
find hold for other times and places, and could thus offer a basis for comparative research. 
Additionally, in order to test the modernization narrative, we compare how the relational bases in 
agency contracts evolved over time in three samples: 1751, 1800, and 1851. The years 1751 and 
1851 were unexceptional politically and economically (there was no revolution, war harshly 
impacting trade, large wave of bankruptcies, etc.). Moreover, they coincide with the dates of a 
digital database of all Parisian notarial records (ARNO), which provided information useful to 
selecting the notaries suitable to our study. The year 1851 is situated after major changes in 
transportation due to the creation of canals and railways in the 1820s–40s, but long before the 
telegraph began to be routinely used for commercial purposes. Our use of the year 1800 as a 
midway check allows us to observe the initial effects of the legal reforms that the French Revolution 
instantiated. In the context of revolutionary and imperial wars, 1800 was relatively uneventful.  
Our database covers four French cities: Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, and Lille. Each one had 
prominent merchants in our period and was tied to different industries and important commercial 
                                                          
23
 For a critical survey of the trust literature, see Guinnane, ‘Trust’. Like him, we consider that the concept of 
trust does not add much to our understanding of delegation, as it is often loosely defined or refers to 
something we cannot observe. We do not assume that a power of attorney is just the legal vehicle for 
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activities in different regions of the world.24 Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles were the largest cities by 
population and the most important commercial centers in France in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Lille was the only major French city with an experience of industrial growth and rural 
exodus similar to that apprehended by the British.25 We chose three notaries in each city, for each 
year, and collected all the proxy forms registered by those notaries in those years, rather than using 
a random sample of all notarial records. This latter solution would not have been very practical 
(except for Paris in 1751 and 1851) due to the lack of a consolidated list of all notarial records 
(dozens of notaries worked in each city).  
We selected those notaries who had the greatest number of merchants among their 
clientele (see Online Appendix for details). We intentionally biased our data collection in favor of 
merchants, as they often play the role of protagonists in the storyline of the rise of a commercial, 
impersonal society. Note that by oversampling merchants, who in any case under this account would 
be more prone to impersonal relationships, we make it easier to find the radical shift predicted by 
the dominant narrative of modernity. 
We collected in total 2,831 proxy forms (‘full sample’). Notarized proxy forms could record 
the identity of the proxy (72 per cent of the forms did), could be blank (21 per cent) –– that is, no 
name or function was given for the proxy, just a blank space –– or could have originally been blank 
and filled in later (7 per cent). For each proxy form, we coded its length (85 per cent were two pages 
or fewer); the main object of the agency contract; and variables describing the identities and gender 
of both the principal and the proxy (one quarter of the principals and 10 per cent of the known 
proxies were female) and, if recorded, their occupation or social status, their addresses, and the 
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 See for example, Bergeron, Banquiers; Chassagne, Veuve Guerin et fils; Carrière, Négociants marseillais; 
Hirsch, Entreprise et institution. 
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relationship between them. (See descriptive statistics on all our variables in Table 1 of the Online 
Appendix.) In addition, for 870 randomly selected forms (‘reduced sample’), our database records 
each of specific subtasks the proxy was authorized to perform for the principal, along with a dozen 
variables referring to the existence of diverse restrictive or discretionary clauses.  
In spite of legal and economic mutations between 1751 and 1851, as Table 1 shows, the 
types of principals and tasks in our samples did not change much over time. In each period, one 
quarter to one third of the proxies were supposed to recover debts or other sums owed; the same 
share of contracts had to do with managing estates, inheritance proceedings, or doing everything for 
the principal; 20 to 25 per cent of forms delegated the task of selling annuities or collecting interest, 
except in 1800, when the market for annuities had collapsed. Overall, one quarter of principals were 
merchants (more for debt recovery); approximately 15 per cent were in other commercial 
occupations (bankers, artisans, skilled workers, etc.); one quarter of the occupations were unknown; 
and the rest were lawyers, civil servants, ‘propertied persons’, clergy members, etc.. As the use of 
notarized powers of attorney changed very little over time, we have a good vantage point to observe 
evolutions in the choice of proxies and their relationship with principals. 
A caveat to our sample is that a power of attorney could be granted, and considered as such 
in courts, without being notarized. It is, therefore, likely that the vast majority of powers of attorney 
did not survive –– or even were never written, or written as such. An oral order, or the order to do 
something included in an ordinary letter, could be considered valid by a court, both before and after 
the French Revolution.26 In addition, one way to make the contract more official while paying less 
than a notarial fee was to have it registered (acte sous seing privé), which left few usable traces in 
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 The Civil Code required written proof for powers of attorney whose subject matter exceeded the value of 
150FF. If the object was commercial, witnesses could, however, substitute the written proof, independently of 
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the archives.27 Further, it could be argued that, ceteris paribus, the closer the preexisting 
relationship, the less the power would need to be notarized. This could be true because social norms 
would make formalization less necessary (by ensuring that no dispute would occur, or that disputes 
would be dealt with inside the family) or for legal reasons.28 The fact that we find as high as 25 per 
cent of notarized forms given to kin, however, indicates a demand for formalization of even the 
most embedded relationships. Those contracts were, in fact, strikingly similar to all the others in 
terms of length and final clause.  
Drawing more complete, official contracts could indeed have its virtues. The proxy might 
have needed to prove to third parties her legitimacy to conclude a binding deal. For women, minors, 
or foreigners, formalized powers of attorney acted as a bulwark for the legal rights of those holding 
the proxy rather than as a safeguard for those giving the proxy. Finally, it is likely that powers of 
attorney were notarized if high stakes were involved (such as general powers to manage the 
properties of a person), or because the parties anticipated that they might have to go to court. 
Whereas non-notarized and even unwritten contracts could be admitted as evidence, the many 
ongoing jurisprudential debates, both before and after the Revolution, suggest that leaving judges to 
apply default rules could be a risky strategy.29 Thus, a notarized proxy form does not signify an 
especially high level of trust between the parties but could, in some cases, conceivably indicate some 
                                                          
27
 The notarial fees to write a proxy form were never officially standardized, but the total expenses incurred for 
a notarized form in Paris seems to have been about 2 to 2.5 livres before the Revolution and 17 to 25FF after 
the Revolution (in other cities, the sums were a bit lower). This amounts to about 10 days of work for an 
unskilled male worker. Written, registered, but non-notarized proxy forms (actes sous seing privé) only were 
charged a registration tax of about 10 sols, then a little more than 1FF (half a day of work). The archives have 
traces of their registration, but they very often give only the date and the names of the parties. On notarial 
fees, Amiaud, Le tarif général; Mourlon and Jeannest-Saint-Hilaire, Formulaire général. 
28
 For example, Art. 1432 of the Civil Code explicitly stated that each spouse tacitly had the power to manage 
the other’s property. In the eighteenth century, jurisprudence recognized that a wife did not need a written 
proxy from her husband to buy merchandise (Crowston, Credit). 
29 
Pothier, ‘Traité du contrat de mandat’; Troplong, Le droit civil expliqué; Dalloz and Dalloz, ‘Mandat’; Xifaras, 
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measure of distrust that had to be mitigated by reliance on the legal system as a credible threat of 
sanction. 
Yet, the study of clauses in our sample qualifies the idea that the added formalization would 
have primarily been used to prevent abuse by the proxy. On the contrary, the most detailed 
contracts gave the proxy more discretion. Pothier, writing in the 1760s, discussed the interpretation 
of prices given in powers of attorney and insisted that the principal would ultimately have to agree 
to those prices.30 However, almost none of our contracts mention specific prices, and many explicitly 
state, in their final clause, that the principal promises to ‘agree to the terms determined by the 
proxy’ (‘avoir le tout pour agréable’) or, in 35 cases, to ratify all the actions of the proxy.31 Only 6 per 
cent of our contracts include any kind of restriction on the proxy’s discretion, for example, discussing 
with the principal before making some decisions; or specific parameters on a certain task to be 
executed, such as the length of leases the proxy must decide on. On the contrary, many contracts 
use long clauses that emphasize the proxy’s discretion; as an instance, the proxy can sign a 
settlement in a bankruptcy proceeding, even at a loss. They enumerate all the tasks that the proxy 
was authorized to perform as a consequence of the main task. For example, 45 per cent of the 
contracts mention the possibility of going to court; whereas, representation in court was the main 
object of only 4 per cent of our proxy forms. In addition, final clauses often add the idea that the 
proxy should do ‘as the circumstances will dictate’ (‘ce que les circonstances exigeront’), ‘what will 
                                                          
30
 Pothier, ‘Traité du contrat de mandat’. 
31 
Numbers and frequencies in this paragraph refer to our reduced sample. The clause was used by Londoners, 
in 1851, to have the Parisian banker Ferrère-Laffitte recover annuities for them in Paris (e.g., Archives 
Nationales, MC/ET/X/1216, 2 Feb. 1851: deposit of proxy form drawn in London, 24 Jan. 1851), as well as by an 
unmarried Marseillaise cook, Marie Sophie Franchette Cornut, in the same year, who gave blank powers to 
deal with her father’s inheritance; he was a blacksmith who had died in Switzerland (Archives départementales 
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be useful’ (‘tout ce qui sera utile’), ‘and generally do whatever is necessary’ (‘et généralement faire le 
nécessaire’).  
Although it is conceivable that we are working with a small, non-representative subsample 
of the contracts that a lawyer would consider as powers of attorney, the vast quantities of notarized 
powers of attorney are significant enough to warrant attention. In addition, the discussion above 
suggests that self-selection in notarizing the proxy form is unlikely to be an issue. Most importantly, 
since we are interested in changes over time in the fraction of personal versus impersonal 
relationships, a potential bias would only arise if the probabilities to formalize personal and 
impersonal relationships changed differentially over time. We are not aware of events that would 
have altered the demand for formalization differentially for personal and impersonal relationships 
over time.  
 
II 
The narrative of modernization would imply that over time principals relied less and less on 
proxies with whom they had close ties, especially members of their family. In addition to testing this 
hypothesis, this section casts light on other interesting patterns regarding the uses of powers of 
attorney by gender and occupation of the principal, and how the task to be performed influenced 
the choice of proxies.  
Having surveyed a large quantity of notarized proxy forms, we are confident that the 
archetypical types of personal relationships were exhaustively recorded in the source: kinship ties 
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cent of cases.32 In addition, we deduced from their addresses that some parties lived in the same 
building or on the same street, which we considered as a likely personal tie between neighbours 
(found in 16 cases, or 0,8 per cent of forms). This leaves the vast majority of cases without any 
recorded preexisting relationship between the parties. Even if we exclude blank forms, which we will 
discuss in Section IV, 80 per cent of powers did not contain any information on the relationship 
between the parties. This does not mean that the interactions represented by these 80 per cent 
were completely anonymous. Apart from occupational homophily or relational chains, which we 
discuss in the following sections, the obvious case is that of ‘friendship’, the ideal-type used by 
lawyers to characterize powers of attorney. The parties and the notaries did not, however, use the 
vocabulary of friendship in any way, be it purely rhetorical or not, in the contracts; they did not give 
any hints, either, about shared citizenship, religion, or any other basis for communitarian solidarity.   
A preliminary analysis of the evolution of the fraction of proxies given to kin and other 
explicitly related persons, depicted in Table 2, reveals that the differences between 1751 and 1851 
are not striking. Interestingly, Poisson found a similar share of proxy forms given to kin (24 per cent, 
including 11 per cent between spouses) in Parisian records of the 1960s, despite their being quite 
different from ours in terms of the tasks to be performed. There were no debt recoveries, 
inheritance proceedings, or management of estates; but more sales and loans existed than in our 
period.33  
In order to more rigorously test whether relationships between principals and proxies in the 
notarized contracts became more impersonal from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries, we 
employ the following simple specification: 
                                                          
32
 Percentages calculated on non-blank forms. Our 41 ‘other explicit ties’ include 16 employees of the 
principal, 7 associates, 3 colleagues (e.g., priests in the same congregation), and 15 miscellaneous cases. 
33
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                                                                [1] 
where           denotes the binary outcome of interest, in this case, whether in the proxy form   a 
personal tie (defined as above; therefore, often a family tie) existed between the principal and her 
proxy;    is a vector of characteristics such as the main object of the agency contract, the notary’s 
location, the principal’s occupation, the number of principals listed and their gender;      =1 if 
year=1800, zero otherwise and      =1 if year=1851, zero otherwise (1751 is the reference year) ; C 
are city fixed effects; and    is the idiosyncratic error term. These underlying variables are defined in 
Table 1 of the Online Appendix. The model is estimated using a logistic regression and the sample is 
restricted to non-blank powers; i.e., to those powers of attorney for which the principals directly 
chose the proxies, as opposed to ‘blank’ or ‘filled-in blank’ powers in which another person, 
probably a notary in many cases, chose a proxy on behalf of the principal.34  
The modernization thesis predicts that       and is decreasing in t (when 1751 is the 
reference category). As Table 3, column 1 shows, this hypothesis is rejected in our data: both cohort 
coefficients are insignificant, which suggests no changes over time in principals’ reliance on agents 
with personal ties. Furthermore, this result is robust to alternative specifications.35 First, redefining 
the dependent variable more conservatively to consider personal links as only those with family ties 
does not change the results. Second, it is theoretically possible that the aggregate results might be 
masking subtler patterns of depersonalization led by differential trends by city, object of the power 
of attorney, or the principal’s occupation. For example, Paris, as the more ‘modern’ city, might have 
                                                          
34
 As discussed in Section IV, principals may choose to grant a power of attorney through a blank or a non-
blank form. Conditional on the principal’s choice of a non-blank form, the principal decides on the identity of 
the proxy. In contrast, with a blank form the ultimate choice of the proxy lies outside of the principal’s control 
(with a notary for instance). Using the full sample to study the personal versus non-personal choice would 
therefore conflate the principal’s and the notary’s choices. In Section IV we focus on the choice between blank 
and non-blank as the outcome variable.  
35




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
had a head start in modernizing, commercial matters might more easily have been handled by 
strangers, and merchants were often regarded as more prone to impersonal relationships. To test 
for these disaggregate differential trends, we have re-estimated our model with a set of interactions 
of year with city, object, or principal’s occupation. All cohort coefficients and most interaction 
coefficients are insignificant, which rules out different evolutionary paths by city, by type of object, 
and by type of occupation. 
Table 3 column 1 also reveals interesting patterns vis-à-vis powers of attorney in general. 
Other things being equal, female principals compared to male ones tended to engage proxies with 
personal links. The recent literature on powers of attorney given to wives by their husbands 
notwithstanding, the reverse situation was as frequent. Merchant principals were more prone, all 
other things being equal, to choose strangers as proxies, seemingly confirming contemporary 
suspicions that they were at the vanguard of anonymizing the delegation of power. 
Compared to the reference category — which includes commercial operations such as 
(mostly) the sale of merchandise or ships, the management of bankruptcies, and the winding up of 
businesses — principals tended to choose proxies with personal ties less often for other limited, 
specialized tasks. Such tasks included management of annuities and lawsuits; only 6 per cent of non-
blank proxies dealing with annuities were kin, and 12 per cent of attorneys-at-law. Conversely, 
proxies with personal ties were more likely to be chosen to exercise general powers, which entitled 
the proxy to do everything in the principal’s name, or to perform such tasks as the management of 
inheritance proceedings, of a company, of land and buildings. Those tasks were mostly 
noncommercial; but, more importantly, they were complex and consequential. Here, the intuitive 
idea that they would not be delegated to an unknown person often holds. Spouses received 33 per 
cent of the 130 general powers of attorney, and 30 per cent were given to other kin (but 3 are 
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were given to neighbours, 3 to an associate, and 6 to an employee: this is the one task for which 
‘other ties’ played an important role. Anecdotal evidence from a study of printed circulars from the 
nineteenth century hints that such powers of attorney were one step in commercial careers, used to 
further integrate young relatives and sometimes long-serving employees in a company before 
making them full partners.36 
Our evidence is thus consistent with no depersonalization per se, in the sense of principals’ 
consciously being more likely, over time, to choose unrelated parties to the detriment of kin or other 
close acquaintances.  
III 
Proxy forms do not inform us about the embeddedness of commercial relationships in 
friendship, religious, or ethnic communities. They allow us, however, to test the version of the 
homophily hypothesis discussed in the introduction: does the mere fact of being a merchant matter 
to fellow merchants when it comes to choosing a proxy? 
The words marchand, négociant, and commissionnaire, which we have used to define the 
category ‘merchant’, were still often used, in the first half of the nineteenth century, with Old 
Regime social statuses in mind. That is, they denoted wholesale operations and some degree of 
recognition by fellow merchants as being part of a local elite.37 An interesting anecdotal case hints 
that those self-identifying as merchants could be considered, by fellow merchants, better proxies 
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See, for example, a brother and employee (Centre d’archives du monde du travail [henceforth CAMT], 
69AQ/3, sent to Foache from Le Havre, 1 Jan. 1824); a brother-in-law (Archives municipales de Marseille, 
Fonds Roux, LIX-164, sent from Bordeaux, 1 June 1816); a son (CAMT, Le Havre, 1 July 1826); long-time 
employees (CAMT, Le Havre, 28 Aug. 1817, 1 March 1824, 1 Jan. 1828, 10 April 1830) promoted to proxy in 
various companies, sometimes explicitly as a ‘testimony of our trust’; another son promoted from proxy to 
partner (CAMT, Le Havre, 1 Jan. 1827); and a long-time proxy of the father, then of his son, finally becoming a 
partner (CAMT, Le Havre, 1 June 1814). 
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than others. In a related study of printed circulars, we found a former merchant, a certain Bruguière, 
advertising for his new company, which offered services of representation in courts and, more 
broadly, before the authorities. Bruguière used the mutual recognition among merchants to 
promote his new business and stated that a former merchant would provide better services than 
any other person.38 This rhetoric points to the signalling power of the label ‘merchant’ among peers. 
Since our dataset records the occupation of principals and proxies, we can test for the 
presence and evolution over time of relationships based on occupational homophily. In Table 3 
column 2, we estimate specification (1) with a set of interactions of year with principal’s occupation 
and using as a dependent variable a binary outcome indicating whether the principal and her proxy 
shared the same occupation, defined in broad categories.39 The regression results reveal that 
merchants were more likely than those in other categories to choose a proxy in their own 
occupation (ceteris paribus, i.e., not just to perform commercial tasks). However, the interaction 
terms show that this homophily among merchants decreased between 1751 and 1851 (Figure 1 in 
the online appendix visually sums up the results of the interaction regression). While merchants 
remained more likely than principals in other categories to choose a proxy in their own occupation, 
this decrease made them less specific. We may here be capturing an effect of the revolutionary 
abolition of statutory privileges as well as of simultaneous economic and social changes, including 
                                                          
38
 Bruguière’s case also exemplifies the prevalence of professional proxies and the use of relational chains. He 
certainly had to use licensed attorneys to go to court, but his skill as a professional proxy (he stated that this 
sort of business required ‘full-time dedication’) knowledgeable about the needs of merchants would be to find 
the best attorneys. Archives municipales de Lyon, Fonds Veuve Guérin, 4J331, sent by Bruguière aîné, ‘agent 
de commerce’ in Marseilles, 1 May 1809. 
39
 Merchant; financial occupation; employee of merchant; manufacturer, artisan, shopkeeper or skilled 
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specialization, textbooks’ and printed directories’ lowering barriers to entry, that cast doubt on the 
qualities previously associated with the merchant category and on the boundaries of that category.40 
How can we distinguish between a match based on professional expertise and one based on 
status or membership to a group? That is, when we see a principal merchant choosing a merchant as 
a proxy, is it due to a mutual recognition of belonging to a group (‘status homophily’) or due to the 
merchant proxy’s special abilities and skills (‘preference for merchants’ skills’)? Controlling for the 
task to be performed gives us a partial answer: what we observe here is not only the choice of 
merchants to recover debts, settle accounts, or manage businesses. Merchants in our sample gave 
36 of their non-blank general powers or powers to deal with inheritance, land, or family to fellow 
merchants, including 26 to unrelated merchants. This is suggestive of homophily, although we 
cannot rule out that some of those unrelated merchants were social acquaintances, living in the 
same neighbourhood or meeting at the stock exchange, for example; whereas, others were perhaps 
generally deemed trustworthy as merchants.  
An alternative analytical strategy builds on the fact that merchant proxies might have 
possessed special skills which were valued by other groups as well. Table 3, column 3 shows the 
results of a regression that estimates specification (1) with a dependent variable indicating whether 
the proxy is a merchant (17 per cent of non-blank forms), and includes a set of interactions of year 
with principal’s occupation, broadly defined. We find that merchants as principals are more likely to 
choose merchant proxies than principals in noncommercial occupations; whereas, the coefficient for 
other commercial occupations (bankers, manufacturers, employees of merchants, artisans, etc.) is 
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 Deschanel, ‘Que vaut un négociant?’, who studied the fates of merchants and of the word ‘négociant’ during 
and after the French Revolution, similarly concludes that the category kept its meaning but witnessed 
important transformation. Bartolomei et al., ‘L’encastrement’, on the basis of merchant correspondences, find 
that established houses still relatively avoided outsiders, especially specialized traders who would not self-




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
not significant. Under the assumptions that principals of all groups have equal access to merchant 
proxies, and that merchant proxies’ skills are equally valuable to principals of all groups, this result 
indicates a preference for a social group and not simply for the skills associated with the agent 
performing commercial transactions.  
However, starting in 1751 the share of merchants among proxies continuously decreased 
over time among all groups. According to the interaction terms, this decrease was less pronounced 
among merchants principals compared to other groups. Between 1800 and 1851, all other things 
being equal, the share of merchant proxies among principals of other groups decreased at a faster 
pace than among merchant principals. This analysis would point generally toward merchants’ 
remaining a rather distinct social group but being less often entrusted as proxies with tasks that 
were not strictly commercial — perhaps as a product of a growing division of labour. Our results 
here go in the direction expected by more nuanced modernization narratives but do not indicate 




The evidence found so far disposes us to dismiss the modernization thesis in its radical form, 
which postulates a shift from an ideal-type to another. Principals did not display an increase over 
time in their preference for strangers, and merchant homophily did not disappear. Personal ties and 
shared status were not, however, the only relational basis principals could resort to. In this section 
we take up the use of blank forms, which indicate an arguably more important change in the period: 
the increasing use of relational chains to find proxies. Such change is also evidenced by the frequent 
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In blank forms, no name or occupation was given for the proxy, just a blank space. Among 
our notarized proxy forms, 19 per cent were blank in 1751; 20 per cent in 1800; and 24 per cent in 
1851. 8 per cent in 1751, 6 per cent in 1800 and 7 per cent in 1851 were originally blank and filled in 
later: the name, and often the proxy’s occupation and address, were written in a different 
handwriting. Two thirds of our filled-in blank proxy forms are ‘deposits’: the proxy filled in his name, 
then had his notary record the form. Nineteenth-century lawyers made little or no mention of such a 
practice. Interestingly, a similar share of blank forms appeared in notarial records of the 1960s.41   
Blank forms were, as one might expect, more often used for tasks such as debt recovery and 
going to court (35 and 36 per cent of blank forms) than for other tasks such as managing a company 
(12 per cent). To better assess change in the frequency of the use of blanks forms over time, we 
estimate (1) by defining as a dependent variable a binary outcome that takes a value equal to 1 if the 
proxy form is blank or filled-in blank; 0, otherwise. The regression includes a set of interactions of 
year with principal’s occupation, broadly defined. The 1851 cohort coefficient is significant and 
positive, indicating an increase in blank forms compared to 1751 (Table 4, column 1). Ceteris paribus, 
merchants were not more likely than other groups to give a blank power of attorney, but the 
interaction terms reveal more nuanced patterns. Compared to other groups, merchants already gave 
more blank powers in 1800. This might mean that merchants were pioneers in this practice in 1800, 
but by 1851 all the other groups had followed; and there is no difference among groups in the 
probability of giving a blank power of attorney.   
Why would principals use blank forms, and was this choice a move toward more anonymity 
in delegation relations? The likelihood is that, in many cases, the use of a blank form was in some 
way related to the place in which the task was to be performed — something that we found 
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surprisingly difficult to code because it is very seldom explicitly mentioned. Perhaps the principal did 
not know that place well, but it was where the deceased had lived or the debtor was currently 
located, and so on. Thus, it might have been useful to find a still-unknown proxy there, rather than 
to employ someone the principal knew but who was located in the wrong place. For example, Jean-
Charles Galhaut, a merchant in Amiens, head of the Galhaut & Thibaut Company, sought to recover 
2,000 FF (equivalent to the yearly wages of a clerk) from a Lyonnaise company for merchandise he 
had sold them and for which they had not paid. His blank proxy form for this task was recorded 
almost one year later, in Lyons, filled in with the name of a company, not a person, as proxy 
(‘Bourget père et fils aîné de Lyon’).42  
This example, along with many others, suggests that drawing a power could be just one step 
in such a chain, ultimately leading to the creation of a principal-proxy relation. This chain probably 
relied on recommendations, especially by notaries and possibly by other professionals, such as 
lawyers. Lawyers writing about powers of attorney commented on the growing trust clients put in 
their notaries.43 Such commentators were talking about notaries acting as proxies, though, not as 
intermediaries used to find proxies. The role of French notaries in the circulation of economic 
information and the matching of contract partners has already been well documented.44 Similarly to 
what the literature has shown about the search for credit partners, our principals could have trusted 
their notary to look for a proper proxy and provide him with the blank form, which the proxy would 
then fill in with his name and sometimes record with his own notary. When the task had to be 
performed in a distant place, the notary in that place could be used as an intermediary to find an 
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 ADR, 3E/12868, deposit of 1er ventôse an 8 (20 Feb. 1800), proxy form of 28 ventôse an 7 (18 March 1799). 
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 Dalloz and Dalloz, ‘Mandat’. 
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adequate proxy. In this sense, blank — and filled-in blank — forms indicate not anonymity but, 
rather, the role of relational chains.  
Moving from the relationship between the parties to the phrasing of the contracts, our data 
reveal an additional form and layer of delegation of authority creating relational chains. Substitution 
clauses, which have likewise not drawn scholarly attention, allowed the proxy to choose another 
proxy, who would perform all or some of the tasks included in the power of attorney. In the frequent 
case of a general substitution clause, the proxy could be only the first person in a chain of delegation 
of powers. Indeed, this clause was not a mere boilerplate, as we found 100 substitution contracts in 
our sample –– that is, forms in which the first proxy transferred powers to a second one, without any 
explicit intervention of the principal. It is likely that many other substitutions occurred without being 
notarized, especially when they were partial and/or provisional.  
These data undermine both the relational interpretation of powers of attorney as 
manifestations of trust that we find among nineteenth-century lawyers –– a view that persists to our 
day–– and the sharp divide built by contemporaries between powers given among equals and those 
given to professionals, as the former could be a first step toward the latter. A proxy form with a 
substitution clause could indicate that the principal entrusted the proxy not so much to perform 
tasks as to find reliable agents to do so.  
Forty-seven per cent of the forms in our reduced sample include a final, general substitution 
clause. Around 23 per cent of all proxy forms (some of which might contain a final, general 
substitution clause) include a partial clause. They mention a specific task that could be performed by 
a person chosen by the proxy, who would often represent the principal in court or perform 
transactions for him/her at the stock exchange. These were tasks that only a licensed 
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principals might have chosen nonprofessionals as proxies for a general power of attorney —even if 
the general task to be performed included auxiliary tasks that would have to be subcontracted to 
professionals — and that many principals left the choice of these professionals to their proxy.  
As Table 4 column 2 shows, substitution clauses were surprisingly ubiquitous in the sense 
that they were not significantly associated with specific types of principals (once again, merchants 
did not exhibit a particularly ‘modern’ behaviour) or strongly associated with specific tasks. Indeed, 
the only pattern that we found in general substitution clauses was a strong differentiation between 
cities, indicating local notarial custom. Partial substitution clauses, on the contrary (Table 4 column 
3), were found everywhere in a similar proportion. This makes sense, as the skills and legal status of 
the proxy were unknown when the form was drafted: the proxy might need to provide legal 
representation or sell annuities and not be deemed able to do so. Partial substitution clauses, which 
thus can be read as indicators of the perceived need for specialization, interestingly were more 
frequent, ceteris paribus, in 1800 and 1851 than in 1751. Although the evolution was not linear as 
there was a decrease between 1800 and 1851, this points in the general direction of 
professionalization. 
Blank forms and partial substitution clauses were thus widely, increasingly, and often jointly 
used during our period. Modernization, in the case of proxy forms, seems to have very much relied 
on relational chains, with notaries playing key roles as brokers of recommendations as well as 
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Quite often, filled-in blank forms ended up with clerks of notaries as proxies.45 These clerks 
were clearly in a good position to be recommended to undecided principals. Some of them regularly 
acted as proxies, performing a variety of tasks, receiving filled-in blanks as well as non-blank forms, 
seemingly making a reputation as specialists on the role of proxy. As in the case of partial 
substitution clauses, the empirical widespread presence of such frequent proxies is an indicator of a 
growing division of labour as well as of the importance of relational chains. 
Conservative lawyers, as well as nineteenth-century writers generally, were very much 
concerned about this type of individual, whose only business was to manage the business of others. 
As their role as proxies would necessarily call for compensation beyond expenses, although the 
forms never explicitly stated this, they threatened the Roman definition of ‘power of attorney’ as a 
voluntarily accepted assignment from a friend. Often called ‘agents d’affaires’ (‘business agents’, 
with a negative connotation), they would perform all sorts of tasks as proxies or in other variously 
defined positions –– for instance, as arbitrators for commercial courts, trustees in bankruptcies, 
etc.46  
The growing division of labour at play in delegation, rather than a contract between similar 
friends, is apparent in the clauses of our reduced sample. Final clauses that explicitly stated that the 
proxy could do ‘whatever the principal could have done if he or she had been present’ (‘tout ce que 
le constituant pourrait faire lui-même s’il était présent en personne’), or could have done ‘in person’, 
tended to disappear from cohort to cohort (Table 4, column 4). An alternative specification that has 
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 This was the case for 24 filled-in blank forms, or 16% of those in which the occupation of the proxy was 
known, as compared to 4% of non-blank forms. 
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 Boigeol and Dezalay, ‘De l’agent d’affaires au barreau’. Cheney, Cul de sac, documents the bad reputation of 
Creole managers acting as proxies of absentee owners of plantations; many such managers worked for 
multiple owners. Yates, ‘Making metropolitan markets’, discusses the birth of a new type of professional 
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‘1800’ as the reference category confirms a significant decrease between 1800 and 1851. Giving a 
power of attorney could more often be recognized as a way to get something done that one, despite 
being present, was not capable to do herself. This suggests that powers of attorney were used in the 
hiring of experts, or at least of proxies who had more knowledge or experience than the principal, in 
order to conduct specialized transactions. Consistent with this interpretation, the clause was more 
rarely found in contracts having to do with rent annuities and never in the contracts of frequent 
proxies, which we define as proxies that were found in at least four different proxy forms in our 
sample. 
Having coded in our sample the identities of principals and proxies as well, we can identify 
frequent proxies and track their growing professionalization over time. We, in fact, found two 
different types of frequent proxies. The first type involved tasks that had historically been assigned 
to specific professionals long before our period. This was the case for attorneys-at-law, who did not 
need notarized proxy forms for each case — which explains why they do not figure prominently in 
our data — and for bankers and brokers dealing with rent annuities. Here, division of labour and 
professionalization were nothing new. For example, two brokers at the Lille stock exchange in 1851, 
Frédéric Tattet fils (a proxy in 79 separate contracts, or 38 per cent of our Lille sample for that year) 
and Joseph Jules Blerzy (20 contracts) used several different notaries, bringing their own standard 
proxy forms with them. All their contracts look the same, independently of which notary registered 
them. Some professionals who often acted as proxies, therefore, used notaries to certify their 
contracts but did not really need them to provide templates. They do not seem to have needed 
notaries to find clients, either; or, if they had needed them at some point, it was now sufficient to 
have repeated relations or direct recommendations by clients: ‘Tattet’ and ‘Blerzy’ appear on no 
filled-in blank form. We found no equivalent in our 1800 sample, when banks and the stock 
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For example, in our Parisian archives for 1751, we found 12 non-blank forms and 4 filled-in forms 
given to Anne Marguerite de la Faye de Joyenval, the widow of a ‘rent receiver’ (‘receveur des 
rentes’) who obviously continued his business. In a regression not reported here but including the 
same covariates as in (1), we found no cohort effect on the use of such frequent proxies.  
The second type of frequent proxy comes closer to the idea of a generalist professional 
proxy, or business agent. This time, it seems indeed to be a figure of the nineteenth century. To 
delimitate this group, we focus on proxies appearing at least 4 times in our sample and who do not 
deal with rents. Their main tasks were the management of estates or inheritance proceedings and 
debt recovery. We find 18 persons and 124 contracts, 98 of which were drawn up in 1851. This 
represents 11 per cent of non-blank or filled-in blank forms for this cohort, as compared to 2 per 
cent in 1751 and 1800. This effect holds in a multivariate regression (Table 4, column 5): the 
coefficient for 1851 indicates that principals were over 4 times more likely to use a generalist 
professional proxy than their predecessors were in 1751. Contrary to other commercial occupations, 
merchants were as equally likely as propertied persons or civil servants to use this type of proxy.  
Honing in on frequent proxies makes it clear that the emergence of professional business 
agents did not necessarily imply anonymity, not only because principals relied on the proxies’ 
names, which they might have found in directories, but also because recommendation played a role. 
Étienne Maurice Olivier, a notary’s clerk, was a proxy in eight contracts in Lille in 1851. He held three 
non-blank and five filled-in blank forms. He could take advantage of his professional position to 
benefit from the brokerage of notaries (he used at least two separate notaries) and find clients in 
Paris, Tours, and Libourne (near Bordeaux) as well as in and around Lille. He sometimes was a broker 
himself rather than a genuine proxy, however: we also found a substitution contract in which he 
transferred the powers conferred to him by Antoine Louis Vallois, a ‘former merchant and 
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whom we found as a proxy in two other contracts.47 The substitution does not give any information 
on the tasks to be performed; in other cases, Olivier was chosen to sell land and buildings, manage 
inheritances, and recover debts. 
Joseph Darasse, a Parisian merchant, was a more specialized frequent proxy. He was chosen 
by 13 clients of the same notary; all but one were representatives of France abroad, such as consuls, 
interpreters, and so on. Most of them appointed him to recover their overdue wages at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and one also asked for annuities to be sold. A widow who gave him a general 
power of attorney was the exception, in that we cannot testify to her ties with diplomacy. He had 
obviously made a reputation among employees of the ministry as a reliable proxy, so much so that 
three of the forms had been drawn in Cairo, Jerusalem, and Tbilissi (Georgia) before being filed in 




Despite having carefully chosen a case study in which macro events — the French Revolution 
and the Industrial Revolution — arguably were likely to transform incentives, leading to less 
interpersonal powers of attorney, we have found little or no support in our data for the simplest 
modernization narrative of a demise of personal ties and a drastic shift to anonymous relationships. 
As this storyline was shared by many contemporaries and is very much present, if sometimes 
implicitly, in historical and economic scholarship today, this is in itself a useful result. We found few 
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significant changes between our periods; and those did not point unequivocally in the direction of 
increasingly anonymous relationships.  
On the basis of the empirical evidence revealed by this study, we cannot rule out that a 
radical shift in the depersonalization of powers of attorney had occurred before the mid-eighteenth 
century. This result is consistent with a recent literature uncovering, through careful empirical 
analysis of contracts, the institutional micro-foundations for impersonal exchange.48 In each case, 
researchers found that incentives for transactions to cross networks arose earlier than other 
scholars had generally thought. 
However, our sources do not paint a picture of a purely anonymous market in which trust 
relied solely on formal institutions. Our results indicate a complementarity between trust based on 
preexisting relationships, especially among kin, and formalization rather than a substitution over 
time. The very use of the most formal contracts — notarized proxy forms — between relatives hints 
at this. If our results, which generally indicate little change, support one overarching modernization 
narrative, it would be that of division of labour rather than depersonalization. Changes to that effect 
appear in our variables related to the phrasing of contracts and to the choice of frequent proxies. 
We have also identified the limits of one common hidden assumption: the idea that what mattered 
to the commercial relationship was preexisting ties between two individuals. On the contrary, blank 
forms and substitution clauses are indications of longer relational chains in which the principal-proxy 
contract is just one step, in the case of substitutions, or could only be established thanks to one or 
several intermediaries, especially notaries, in the case of blank forms.  
Our findings open several avenues for future research. In particular, a companion article 
could model theoretically and test the decision-making process of principals, who had at hand two 
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levers to mitigate opportunism in agency: the choice among different types of proxies, such as 
familial, professional, a blank form, and so on, and the choice of contractual terms and their 
phrasing. Empirically, more systematically comparing notarial practices across places and across 
notaries in the same place would shed light on differences in clauses and perhaps on relational 
chains. Extending our sample across time and zooming in on specific places and social groups may 
illuminate the extent to which powers of attorney were part of the ‘usual business’ of a merchant as 
opposed to an instrument reserved to react to exceptional situations. Understanding when a power 
of attorney represented a one-time interaction or short-term agency leading to a long-term 
partnership would require us to look for traces of reciprocation and mutual agency in the principal-
proxy relationships among merchants. It would elucidate the place of powers of attorney in 
commercial life, and the tradeoffs of these instruments in view of the menu of contractual devices 
available to merchants.  
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Table 1. Frequency of powers of attorney by year according to main object and principal’s occupation 
Notes: a Includes selling merchandise and miscellaneous tasks; e.g., representation in bankruptcy or 
winding up proceedings. b Includes selling land and/or buildings and miscellaneous tasks; e.g., 
representation before the bureaucracy, accepting a donation, representation in family proceedings, 
such as for the care of orphans. c ‘marchand’ or ‘négociant’ or ‘commissionnaire’ in the source denotes 
wholesale activity and social respectability. d Includes bankers, brokers, employees of merchants, 
manufacturers, skilled workers, shopkeepers, master artisans, captains of ships. e Includes lawyers, civil 
servants, propertied persons, doctors, clergy, etc., along with unknown occupations. 
 
Table 2. Evolution in the relationships between principal and proxy 
Year Spouses Other kin Other No mention No. Obs. 
% in 1751 6 16 3 75 632 
% in 1800 10 20 3 67 618 
% in 1851 7 15 2 76 782 
% in Total 8 17 3 73 2032 
Notes: Calculations exclude blank and filled-in blank forms. ‘Other’ includes neighbours (c.1%) along 




   1751  1800 1851  
General powers, inheritance, managing land and/or buildings Merchant c 4% 4% 3% 
Other comm. d  3% 5% 6% 
Other e 13% 25% 17% 
Managing a company 
 
Merchant 2% 3% 2% 
Other comm. 0% 1% 1% 
Other 0% 0% 0% 
Recovering debts or other sums owed Merchant 21% 7% 5% 
Other comm. 3% 5% 4% 
Other 8% 18% 14% 
Selling annuities or collecting interest Merchant 4% 0% 2% 
Other comm. 0% 0% 5% 
Other 15% 5% 18% 
Representation in court Merchant 3% 1% 2% 
Other comm. 1% 1% 0% 
Other 4% 2% 1% 
Commercial tasks a 
 
Merchant 4% 3% 1% 
Other comm. 1% 1% 1% 
Other 1% 3% 3% 
Other civil (noncommercial) tasks b 
 
Merchant 2% 2% 2% 
Other comm. 2% 2% 3% 
Other 8% 8% 10% 
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Table 3. Regression evidence on the evolution of ties between principal and proxy 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE Personal Relationship between 
Principal and Proxy 
Homophily  Merchant Proxy  
MAIN TASK       
General/inher 2.05***  1.10  0.43***  
Manag. Bus. 3.72***  0.61  0.27***  
Justice 0.33***  0.37*  0.21***  
Annuities 0.27***  0.39**  0.44**  
Debt Recovery 0.69  1.27  1.27  
Other civil 1.49  1.19  0.63  
    
PLACE       
Lille 0.68  0.35***  0.35**  
Marseilles 1.20  1.10  1.22  
Paris 0.83  0.59*  0.52**  
Other French 1.25  0.72  0.48**  
Abroad 0.26***  0.61  1.36  
    
PRINCIPAL       
Other comm. 1.15  0.82  0.88  
Merchant 0.73**  4.14***  1.98***  
    
NO. PRINCIPALS    
2 or more 0.86  1.04  0.99  
    
GENDER PRINCIPAL       
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COHORT       
1800 1.03  1.16  0.38***  
1851 0.99  1.01  0.13***  
    
COHORT X PRINCIPAL       
1800 x Other comm.   1.18  1.61  
1800 x Merchant   0.59  1.89*  
1851 x Other comm.   1.17  1.22  
1851 x Merchant   0.31**  3.94***  
       
Constant 0.36***  0.27**  0.40***  
Observations 1,975  919  1,975  
Pseudo R2 0.12  0.14  0.22  
Notes: Estimates reported as odds ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference category: commercial, 
Lyons, other occupation, 1 principal, male, 1751. The reference category is the one for which the profiles of 
proxies (relation to principal, frequent proxy, merchant proxy, blank form) were closest to average, except for 
place and main task. Regressions on full sample, omitting cases with unknown main task, blank and filled-in 
blank forms. In (2), we exclude observations for which the principals’ or proxy’s occupation was ‘unknown’ or 
‘other (please see online appendix for classifications). We also exclude cases in (2) with a personal relationship 
between the principal and proxy and frequent proxies. 
 
Table 4. Regression evidence on relational chains and the appearance of frequent generalist proxies 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  






Final Clause   Frequent 
generalist 
proxy 
MAIN TASK           
General/inher 1.19  1.47  0.87  1.39  0.46**  
Manag. Bus. 0.39**  2.30*  2.44*  1.56  -  
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Annuities 1.08  0.63  0.72  0.22**  0.22***  
Debt Recovery 1.88***  1.48  0.80  1.47  -  
Other civil 2.45***  0.70  0.23***  0.67  0.67  
           
PLACE           
Lille 0.42***  0.64  0.46*  1.26  2.35*  
Marseilles 1.01  1.93***  1.34  5.10***  0.09**  
Paris 0.24***  2.43***  1.43  0.16**  5.17***  
Other French 1.02  0.94  1.18  1.41  4.76***  
Abroad 0.19***  6.44***  0.75  7.86***  2.20  
           
PRINCIPAL           
Other comm. 0.73  1.13  1.20  1.39  0.43*  
Merchant 0.81  1.26  0.93  1.53  1.41  
           
NO. PRINCIPALS           
2 or more 0.94  1.13  0.86  0.88  0.57*  
           
GENDER PRINCIPAL           
Female 0.97  0.85  0.84  2.06**  0.55*  
           
COHORT           
1800 0.87  0.89  6.64***  0.32***  0.77  
1851 1.52***  0.92  2.92***  0.01***  4.43***  
           
COHORT X PRINCIPAL           
1800 x Other comm. 1.31          
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1800 x Merchant 1.79**          
1851 x Merchant 1.35          
           
Constant 0.32***  0.62  0.13***  0.34**  0.02***  
Observations 2,748  862  862  732  1,770  
Pseudo R2 0.08  0.08  0.14  0.36  0.19  
Notes: Estimates reported as odds ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference category: commercial, 
Lyons, other occupation, 1 principal, male, 1751. Regression in (1) and (5) on full sample, omitting cases with 
unknown main task. Regression in (2), (3) and (4) on reduced sample, omitting cases with unknown main task. 
In (4) the dependent variable is whether the proxy form contained a final clause ‘whatever the principal could 
have done in person’ and the regression excludes cases without a final clause.  In (5) debt recovery is the 
reference category because there were no ‘commercial’ cases with a frequent generalist proxy. Note that 
there were no ‘business management’ cases either.  Regression in (5) excludes cases with blank forms. 
 
 
